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Carol Liao*

A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance

What is Canada’s actual legal model to govern its corporations? Recent landmark
judicial decisions indicate Canada is shifting away from an Anglo-American
definition of shareholder primacy. Yet the Canadian securities commissions
have become increasingly influential in the governance sphere, and by nature
are shareholder-focused. Shareholders’ rights have increased well beyond what
was ever contemplated by Canadian corporate laws, and the issue of greater
shareholder vs. board control has now become the topic of live debate. These
conflicting theoretical positions have enriched the dialogue on the current
environment of Canadian corporate governance. This qualitative study brings
together some of Canada’s leading senior legal practitioners to opine on the
fundamental principles that are driving the development of Canadian corporate
governance. Taken within the context of today’s legal and regulatory environment,
their insights piece together the framework of a Canadian model of corporate
governance to further director knowledge and help inform future research
Quel est, au Canada, le modèle juridique qui régit les sociétés par actions? De
récentes décisions judiciaires de principe montrent que le Canada s’éloigne de
la définition anglo-américaine de la définition de la « primauté des actionnaires ».
Malgré cela, les commissions canadiennes des valeurs mobilières sont
devenues de plus en plus influentes dans la sphère de régie interne, et elles
sont intrinsèquement focalisées sur les actionnaires. Les droits des actionnaires
se sont multipliés bien au-delà de ce qui a été envisagé par le droit canadien
des sociétés, et la question de savoir qui des actionnaires ou du conseil
d’administration doit exercer le plus grand contrôle est aujourd’hui le sujet d’un
vif débat. Ces positions de principe conflictuelles ont alimenté le dialogue sur
l’environnement actuel de la gouvernance d’entreprise au Canada. Cette étude
qualitative regroupe les opinions de certains juristes canadiens de grande
réputation sur les principes fondamentaux qui orientent le développement de la
gouvernance d’entreprise au Canada. Pris dans le contexte de l’environnement
légal et du cadre réglementaire actuels, leurs commentaires décrivent le cadre
d’un modèle canadien de gouvernance d’entreprise qui aurait pour objectif
d’accroître la connaissance des administrateurs et de contribuer à alimenter la
future recherche.

*
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. Financial support from the Canadian
Foundation for Governance Research is gratefully acknowledged. Thank you to Stan Magidson,
Christian Buhagiar, Anita Anand, Janis Sarra, Benjamin Richardson, Cristie Ford, Coro Strandberg,
Christie Stephenson, Bill Flanagan, Kyle Fogden, the 32 senior legal practitioners named herein at
footnote 7, the attendees of the 3rd Annual Robert Bertram Award Dinner held on 30 October 2013,
and the editorial board and anonymous reviewers of the Dalhousie Law Journal.
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Introduction
Corporate governance models are frequently addressed in AngloAmerican corporate legal scholarship, with shareholder primacy touted as
the dominant model that governs modern corporations.1 Common themes
in academic debate include whether shareholder primacy is efficient,
whether it should be the dominant model, and how it can be improved,
among other things.2 However, for many of Canada’s legal practitioners,
1.
See e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001)
89:2 Geo LJ 439; Charles Elson, “Five Reasons to Support Shareholder Primacy” (15 April 2010),
online: NACD Directorship Blog <www.directorship.com/charles-elson-shareholder-primacy/>.
Shareholder primacy is also frequently assumed to be the dominate model in articles that critique it;
see e.g., Lynn Stout, “Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy” (2002) 75 S Cal L
Rev 1189.
2.
See e.g., Ian Lee, “Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate about Shareholder Primacy” (2006) 31:2
Del J Corp L 533; Jill Fisch, “Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy” (2006) 31:3 J Corp L 637.
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theoretical models of governance are foreign to the day-to-day functioning
of providing legal services that support good governance practices
within corporations. Academic discussions on shareholder primacy and
other alternative models of governance, such as director primacy,3 team
production,4 enlightened shareholder value,5 and labour-oriented and
state-oriented models,6 are rarely put to the test against the backdrop of
Canadian corporate practice.
The act of recognizing a Canadian model of corporate governance has
its own set of challenges. As one practitioner interviewed for this study
noted:
Many Canadian executives and directors have been schooled on U.S.style governance and that is just a function of the U.S. market being so
much bigger—S.E.C. rules, media, scandals, etc….When you are trying
to study corporate governance as a director or a C.E.O. might, it is easy
to assume that Canadian corporate governance is one and the same as
U.S. corporate governance.

While growth of corporate governance as a field of study in the past
few decades has been formidable, Canadian legal scholars often rely on
American research due to the lack of Canadian-specific scholarship, and
much of the theoretical analysis has blurred country lines.
What is Canada’s actual legal model to govern its corporations?
This article outlines the parameters of a Canadian model of governance
for directors and others to consider. Interviews were conducted with 32
leading senior legal practitioners across Canada, who spoke candidly
on matters involving shareholder primacy, director duties, stakeholder
interests, common law and the courts, regulatory bodies, corporate norms,
and the future trajectory of Canadian corporate governance, among
other things. The observations from these senior practitioners provide a
pulse check on the Canadian governance landscape, offering frank and
thoughtful insights on some of the fundamental principles that drive the
3.
Stephen M Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance”
(2003) 97:2 Nw UL Rev 547.
4.
Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85:2 Va L
Rev 248; Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law” (2006) 44
Alta L Rev 299.
5.
Cynthia Williams & John Conley, “An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct” (2005) 38 Cornell Intl LJ 493; Virginia Harper Ho, “‘Enlightened
Shareholder Value’: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide” (2010) 36:1
J Corp L 59.
6.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1 at 443-447. Hansmann and Kraakman describe the
manager-oriented model as one that existed between the 1930s and the 1960s in the U.S. and the
labour-oriented model as one that peaked in Germany in the 1970s.
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decision making of Canadian corporations. Taken within the context of
today’s legal and regulatory environment, these insights piece together the
framework of a Canadian model to help inform future research.
Section I begins by outlining the methodology of this qualitative
study. Section II then examines a widely-held academic definition of the
shareholder primacy model of corporate governance, made up of five
core principles, and puts it to the test against Canadian corporate legal
practice. Section II.1 examines the question of who should have ultimate
control of the corporation, and draws upon practitioners’ observations
regarding the current debates on shareholder rights plans and other
defensive tactics in Canada. Next, Section II.2 delves into a discussion
on the management of the corporation, and the question of whether “best
interests of the corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” is a
significant or negligible difference in Canadian corporate law. In Section
II.3, practitioners consider the role of stakeholder interests in corporate
decision making, and offer their thoughts on the landmark BCE decision
and how its findings have affected Canadian corporations, if at all. Section
II.4 then addresses the protection of minority shareholder interests, and
Section II.5 considers whether the market value of a company’s shares
should be regarded as the principal measure of shareholders’ interests.
Finally, Section III provides a broader overview of Canada’s legal and
regulatory landscape governing Canadian corporations. How have the
courts helped to form Canadian corporate governance? What has been
the securities commissions’ role? The article concludes with some overall
remarks on the outline of a Canadian model and surmises on the future
development of Canadian corporate governance.
I. Methodology
Potential participants for this study were selected based on several factors,
including: (1) reviews of online profiles from prominent Canadian law
firms where the senior practitioner is identified as a specialist in corporate
governance, among other things, (2) appearances on “Best Lawyers in
Canada” lists, “Lexpert” rankings, “Who’s Who Legal,” “Chambers
Global,” and other equivalent lists, (3) colloquial understandings as to who
the leaders are in Canadian corporate governance, (4) recommendations
from executive members of the Canadian Foundation for Governance
Research, and (5) recommendations offered by participants on other
senior practitioners appropriate for the study. Participation was limited to
those practising in Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary. This was mainly due
to manageability of content, with a focus on the major financial centres of
Canada in common law jurisdictions.
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Invitations to participate were sent to over 100 senior legal practitioners
via email, where 32 indicated interest.7 Questions were emailed a day or
more in advance to give practitioners the option of reviewing questions
beforehand. Interviews were conducted over the phone with the exception
of one practitioner who supplied written answers. Comments by the
practitioners were made on a not-for-attribution basis. Practitioners were
informed that any identifying characteristics within their comments would
be stripped from the article and were invited to speak freely. Gendered
language (such as “his” or “her”) was not used in the article in order to
preserve confidentiality, thus plural pronouns were used. Discussions
were conversational and not beholden to the interview questions, with
the interviewer taking significant liberties to ask for further elaboration or
follow-up questions based on practitioners’ answers. Many practitioners
provided stories and personal accounts in addition to their responses,
and several referenced or provided supplemental material prior to and/
or following their interviews, including journal articles, either authored
by themselves or others, firm news bulletins, web-links, or any additional
thoughts they had. With permission from each participant, interviews were
recorded and later transcribed, with over 1,000 pages of transcriptions
culminating into the following summary of findings.
This article is not meant to be treated as a quantitative study. It is a
qualitative study akin to a fireside chat with a group of knowledgeable
and experienced experts to gain a deeper understanding of Canada’s
governance framework. Throughout the interviews, one was easily struck
by the level of thoughtfulness and candor behind practitioners’ answers.
As one practitioner noted during their interview, “there is a gulf between
what people hope something is, think it should be, and what it is…that
7.
Thank you to the following practitioners who kindly and generously contributed their time and
expertise to this article: William M Ainley, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP; Rita C Andreone,
QC, Lawson Lundell LLP; Jeff Barnes, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Noralee Bradley, Osler, Hoskin
& Harcourt LLP; William J Braithwaite, Stikeman Elliot LLP; Terrence Burgoyne, Osler, Hoskin &
Harcourt LLP; Rob Collins, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Douglas G Copland, Borden Ladner
Gervais LLP; Dallas L Droppo, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Aaron S Emes, Torys LLP; Jean
Fraser, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Sharon C Geraghty, Torys LLP; Mitchell H Gropper, QC,
Farris, Vaughn, Wills & Murphy LLP; Stephen Halperin, Goodmans LLP; Carol Hansell, Hansell
LLP; Doug H Hopkins, Boughton Law Corporation; Michael L Lee, Lawson Lundell LLP; Robert
Lehodey, QC, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Jon Levin, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Andrew
J MacDougall, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; R Hector MacKay-Dunn, QC, Farris, Vaughn, Wills
& Murphy LLP; Margaret C McNee, McMillan LLP; D Shawn McReynolds, Davies Ward Phillips &
Vineberg LLP; William K Orr, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Barry J Reiter, Bennett Jones LLP;
Simon A Romano, Stikeman Elliot LLP; Richard A Shaw, QC, ICDD, Richard A Shaw Professional
Corporation; John Smith, Lawson Lundell LLP; Rene R Sorell, McCarthy Tétrault LLP; Edward J
Waitzer, Stikeman Elliot LLP; Tom Theodorakis, McMillan LLP; and Marvin Yontef, Bennett Jones
LLP.
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may, to some extent, account for some of the difference in views you are
going to hear.” In carefully parsing the comments made by practitioners,
every effort was made to preserve the essence of practitioners’ words, and
to capture the intent behind them in the context they were given.
As this article deals with high-level legal issues, several practitioners
referred to a number of legal terms, important cases, and significant
transactions in their comments. In order to improve flow and readability,
while also accommodating for a range of readers with different legal
backgrounds, certain legal definitions and details on particular cases
and transactions are provided in the footnotes. It should be noted that
participants spoke for themselves and not necessarily for the organizations
with which they are affiliated. Their participation should not be construed
as an endorsement of this article or its findings.
II. Examining legal principles of corporate governance
In their well-known and often cited 2001 article “The End of History for
Corporate Law,” Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, senior Yale and
Harvard law professors, argued that the basic law of corporate governance
across nations had already achieved a high degree of uniformity to the
shareholder primacy model and that “continuing convergence toward [this]
single, standard model is likely.”8 According to Hansmann and Kraakman,
some key normative principles in this consensus include:
(1) ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the
shareholder class;
(2) the managers of the corporation should be charged with the
obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its
shareholders;
(3) other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees,
suppliers, and customers [which, together with shareholders, are
included as “stakeholders”] should have their interests protected by
contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation
in corporate governance;
(4) noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protection from
exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders; and

8.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1 at 439.
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(5) the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the
principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.9
Arguing from an Anglo-American perspective, Hansmann and Kraakman
believed that alternative governance models had already been tried and
had failed.10 Pointing to shareholder primacy’s assumed efficiencies and
its historical economic domination, they contended that the ideological
convergence of this model is unlikely to be undone, especially since “no
important competitors to the standard model of corporate governance
remain persuasive….”11 To Hansmann and Kraakman, the ideological
convergence toward the model meant that general convergence in practice
would eventually follow—thus signifying, for all intents and purposes,
an end of history for corporate law.12 Economic efficiency was the main
force behind Hansmann and Kraakman’s presumption of the long-term
international acceptance of the shareholder primacy model. They identified
profit maximization, historical success, and international competitive
advantage as factors that “made the virtues of [the shareholder primacy]
model increasingly salient.”13
Practitioners were provided with Hansmann and Kraakman’s definition
of shareholder primacy, and asked if they found the definition to be an
accurate depiction of Canadian corporate governance. They were invited
to weigh in on each of the five principles, and discussions followed from
there.

9.
Ibid at 440-441. There seems to be little contention in legal scholarship regarding Hansmann
and Kraakman’s definition of shareholder primacy. See e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3 at 573 (which
describes two principles of shareholder primacy: the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the
principle of ultimate shareholder control); Fisch, supra note 2 at 637 (which asserts that shareholder
primacy “defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth”); Lee, supra
note 2 at 535 (which defines shareholder primacy as “the view that managers’ fiduciary duties require
them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and preclude them from giving independent consideration
to the interests of other constituencies”).
10. These alternatives are described as manager-oriented, labour-oriented, and state-oriented
models. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1 at 443-447.
11. Ibid at 454.
12. Ibid at 455. There is also considerable discourse available on the issue of the global convergence
of corporate governance, both prior to and following Hansmann and Kraakman’s work. See e.g., John
C Coffee Jr, “The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and its Implications” (1999) 93:3 Nw UL Rev 641; Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, eds., Convergence
and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
13. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1 at 449. It is perhaps worthwhile to note that Hansmann and
Kraakman’s article was published in early 2001, prior to a number of financial calamities that marked
the first decade of the 21st century, including the fall of Enron Corporation and other corporate and
accounting scandals in 2001–2002, and, more recently, the global financial crisis. This has not changed
the tenor of the presumed dominance of shareholder primacy in Anglo-American legal scholarship,
but certainly has increased its critiques.
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1.

Control of the corporation

Principle: “Ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the
shareholder class.”
Several practitioners agreed that, in Canada, control belonged with the
shareholder class—but with caveats. The principle of ultimate shareholder
control was described as “mostly right,” “correct subject to general laws
of the land,” and “somewhat true but with very significant exceptions.”
Many focused on the shareholders’ abilities to elect and remove directors
as signifying ultimate control, but pointed out that this control was limited
and far removed from the day-to-day control exercised by the board and
management. Three practitioners likened the control of shareholders to
that of voters in a democratic country, where “as citizens of the country,
our voting franchise is how we elect our representatives.” Directors are the
elected officials who now “have obligations to everybody and, ultimately,
they have to answer to electorate or the shareholders.” Shareholders
therefore are not in a position to decide the specific measures that a
corporation will take in executing or adopting business plans. In that
sense, there is ultimate control but “on a day-to-day basis, control really
rests with the board for resolution.”
A small minority of the practitioners supported greater shareholder
control since shareholders are the ones that have taken on the financial
risk. However, one practitioner put it in the context of the corporation’s
existence, pointing out that when the company’s financial situation has
deteriorated “the party that’s economically at risk is the creditor rather
than the shareholder….[In that circumstance,] there’s more obligation to
the creditor.” A significant majority of the practitioners tended to prefer
greater director control in general.
Interestingly, there were differing interpretations as to whether
Canada was trending towards greater board or shareholder control. A few
practitioners felt that Canada was moving towards greater director control
in practice, noting how “the biggest change over the last ten to fifteen
years has been the increased role and responsibilities of directors, ensuring
governance at the board level is robust.” Other practitioners identified how
administrative rules were generally changing in favour of the shareholder,
as shareholders have been getting a sympathetic ear from the regulators and
the stock exchanges, which have “expanded the universe of shareholders’
rights on various matters well beyond what the law ever contemplated.”
In a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) context, many practitioners pointed
to the securities regulators’ shareholder-centric position on defensive

A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance

567

tactics as representing significantly greater shareholder control in Canada,
particularly when compared with the U.S. position on these measures.
a. Poison pill debate
Canada is considered a very bidder-friendly jurisdiction as National Policy
62-202 Take-Over Bids—Defensive Tactics (NP 62-202) leaves Canadian
boards with a limited number of defences when faced with an unsolicited
take-over bid.14 This position is now under review in Canada. The Canadian
Securities Administrators (CSA), the organization responsible for the
securities regulation of all provinces, has released proposed National
Instrument 62-105 Security Holders Rights Plans, which allows target
boards to implement shareholder rights plans (known as “poison pills”)15
for a longer period than currently permitted when facing a hostile bid,
subject to shareholder approval.16 An alternative proposal has been put forth
by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), the organization mandated
by the Quebec government to regulate Quebec’s financial markets.17 The
AMF proposal seeks a new regime to govern all defensive measures,
allowing boards a greater overall arsenal to defend target companies in the
face of unwanted take-over bids. The extended comment period for these
proposals closed in July 2013.18 As one practitioner observed:
The proposals can be seen as a subtext of who actually should have
ultimate decision making authority in the context of change of control
transactions: whether it should be the shareholders, which is the current
approach of the securities regulatory scheme and the approach the
commissions have traditionally taken on poison pills, or whether the
boards should be more empowered, which is the path the courts seem to
have taken but the regulators have not.
14. Take-Over Bids—Defensive Tactics, OSC NP 62-202 (4 July 1997).
15. A shareholder rights plan is a defensive tactic employed by companies to discourage hostile
takeovers. This is done by making the shares of a company less attractive to the potential acquirer,
either by allowing existing shareholders to buy more shares at a discount, or allowing shareholders to
buy the acquirer’s shares at a discounted price after the merger.
16. Canadian Securities Administrators, “Notice and Request for Comment: Proposed National
Instrument 62-105 Security Holders Rights Plans, Proposed Companion Policy 62-105CP, and
Proposed Consequential Amendments” (14 March 2013) Ontario Securities Commission, online:
Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca>.
17. Autorité des Marchés Financiers, “Consultation Paper: An Alternative Approach to Securities
Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics” Autorité des Marchés Financiers (14 March 2013),
online: Autorité des Marchés Financiers <www.lautorite.qc.ca>.
18. For some helpful summaries providing greater detail on the current proposals, see e.g., Robert
Black et al, “The Competing Visions of the CSA and AMF on Shareholder Rights Plans and Take-over
Bid Defensive Tactics” Davis LLP Securities & Corporate Finance Bulletin (22 April 2013), online:
Davis LLP <www.davis.ca/en/>; John Emanoilidis et al, “Canadian Companies Will be Harder to
Acquire Under New Poison Pill Proposals” Torys LLP M&A Bulletin (14 March 2013), online: Torys
LLP <www.torys.com/Publications>.
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An overwhelming majority preferred the AMF proposal and felt
a regime change was necessary, with one practitioner calling it “more
intellectually honest” than the CSA proposal.19 Another practitioner
believed the proposals were motivated by the desire of the Ontario
Securities Commission (OSC) to “get out of the pill hearing game” and
that “all the OSC is doing is largely codifying what’s developed out of
their own jurisprudence.” There was consensus among practitioners in the
M&A field that Canadian boards did not have enough in their defensive
toolkit to properly respond to take-over bids, citing how “as a board, you
have no bargaining power in Canada.” One practitioner pointed out how
“shares trade over so quickly once the transaction is announced that those
who are holding the shares have a stake in only one thing, which is with a
transaction going ahead.”20 Once a bid is made for a Canadian company,
it can almost be assumed that the company will be sold, as the board has
no way of resisting the bid, and “ultimately no ability to negotiate the best
price or find an alternate because the bidder just has to wait the board out
and then go straight to the shareholders.” Many also preferred the AMF
proposal because it would align more with the U.S. standard of practice in
M&A transactions. The AMF position would put Canada on a more even
playing field on the global capital markets, “essentially bringing us to a
Delaware state of law, which means you can indefinitely keep a hostile
bidder away.”
While some acknowledged the motivation behind regulators’ push
for greater shareholders’ rights was due to a concern that directors
could become entrenched and refuse a take-over bid to perpetuate the
board’s own power, these practitioners felt that fear was unwarranted.
The concern was something that “had an element of truth 30 years ago,”
but nowadays “directors are acutely aware of their fiduciary duties in a
change of control, and that they are exposing themselves to hellacious
lawsuits if they try to entrench themselves with any form of conflict of
interest.” Some practitioners seemed to share a common sentiment that
the OSC was “substituting its visceral reaction for the business judgment
of the directors,” leaving boards “emasculated.” Several said that “better
run companies would have more director primacy” as the directors have
19. The exception was one practitioner, who thought it would be better to work within the CSA’s
proposals and get them right since that was where Canada was probably going to end up, noting how
the acceptance of the AMF proposal was “just never going to happen.” This practitioner did, however,
prefer the AMF proposal.
20. The practitioner went on to state: “A lot of people would say that the people who bought shares
are the ones whose interest you should be protecting—but that starts a step too late. If the board had
the proper ability to negotiate with bidders, people wouldn’t sell as quickly and people would stick it
out and reap the rewards of doing that.”
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the knowledge and capability to make better long-term decisions. The
majority of these practitioners said that negotiating by the board was
the most effective way to obtain the best deal for shareholders. One
practitioner, who strongly argued in favour of the corporation being run
solely for the economic benefit of the shareholders, felt that the regulators
have “tried to write a plan to eliminate the power of the board,” which
philosophically “is exactly where the power ought to be” as a fiduciary of
the shareholders.
Some practitioners were cautiously optimistic that the acceptance
of either proposal could temper the commissions’ shareholder-centric
position slightly in the future, signifying a possible trend towards greater
board control. One noted how “right now the securities administrators all
think, to a greater or lesser degree, that we have gone too far and it’s
time to make take-over protection stronger.” Another commented that the
securities regulators are making decisions “based on what they believe is
the right thing for investors, but not with much thinking as to what is the
right answer for a corporation.” A handful of practitioners contended that,
given how the current debate on poison pills has a particular focus—which
is solely looking at protecting investors in the capital markets from the
commissions’ view—the debate should not be construed to represent the
overall governance model in Canada.
The discussions by practitioners suggest the answer to who holds
ultimate control depends very much on what aspect of the law a practitioner
elects to focus on. Fiduciary duties aside, securities commissions have
clearly favoured shareholders having the ultimate say in take-over
situations, as investor protection is a statutory mandate set out in each
commission’s enabling statute. In this context, and specifically regarding
the current debate on the proper allocation of power in the treatment of
poison pills, many of the practitioners expressed frustration over the
fact that greater director control, in their minds, is more beneficial to
shareholders by increasing their share value in the face of a take-over bid.
On September 14, 2014, the CSA announced that, after considering
both the CSA and AMF proposals and reviewing subsequent comments,
it would be pursuing a “harmonized regulatory approach” regarding takeover bids in Canada. Specifically, the CSA has indicated that its proposed
amendments would require that all non-exempt take-over bids:
(1) be subject to a mandatory majority (more than 50 per cent)
minimum tender of all outstanding target securities (excluding
tenders by the bidder itself or its joint actors);
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(2) be extended by the bidder for an additional 10 days once the
mandatory minimum tender condition has been met and the bidder
has announced its intention to immediately take up and pay for the
securities deposited under the bid; and,
(3) remain open for a minimum of 120 days, subject to the ability of
the target board to waive to a period of no less than 35 days in
certain circumstances and on certain conditions.21
The announcement does not provide any guidance as to how the regulators
plan to regulate poison pills once the new regime is adopted. The CSA
intends to publish the proposed amendments for comment in the first
quarter of 2015.
Stepping back from the poison pill debate, the board and management
clearly exert greater day-to-day control in practice. And of course,
shareholders continue to have the power to elect and remove directors, as
well as the power to approve fundamental changes, access the oppression
remedy, and use or threaten other remedies such as class actions.
Decisions that will follow the proposed amendments as to how securities
commissions across Canada approach poison pills specifically, and
defensive tactics as a whole under the anticipated harmonized approach,
will dictate whether there will be a power swing toward greater board
control in an M&A context in the future, something heavily favoured by a
significant majority of the practitioners interviewed.
2. Manage in the best interests of whom?
Principle: “The managers of the corporation should be charged with the
obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders.”
A few practitioners conceded that people mostly think that the obligation
of the board and management is to manage the corporation in the interests
of its shareholders. Despite this, all practitioners agreed that the theoretical
principle was inconsistent with Canadian corporate law, which under s.
122 of the Canada Business Corporations Act requires that directors and
officers manage the corporation in the “best interests of the corporation”
as opposed to the shareholders.22 The topic of the debate, then, became
whether or not the difference between “best interests of the corporation”
21. Canadian Securities Administrators, News Release, 62-306, “Canadian Securities Regulators
Move Forward with Harmonized Regulatory Approach for Take-Over Bids in Canada” (11 September
2014), online: Canadian Securities Administrators <www.securities-administrators.ca>.
22. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985, c C-44, s 122 [CBCA] (“every director and
officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall act honestly and
in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and “exercise the care, diligence and
skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances”).
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and “best interests of the shareholders” was simply a technical one or if
there was a noteworthy Canadian difference to be had.
A handful of practitioners strongly felt there was no difference, stating
that “it’s the same thing” with one noting how “it’s fine for directors to
believe that it is in the best interest of the corporation, which to me means
the best interest of its shareholders, notwithstanding that the Supreme
Court goes a little off the reservation in this allegation.” Others felt there
was a difference between the two, with a few holding comparably strong
views on the fact that there was a difference, including this practitioner,
who stated:
It’s entirely different, that is not our common law….It should be a
matter of complete indifference to the directors what the interests of
the shareholders are, except if it makes a difference to the corporation.
There’s nothing wrong with taking shareholders’ interests into account,
but that’s incidental….I don’t think the law could possibly be clearer if
you look at the corporate statutes and look at what the courts have said.

A few practitioners noted the difference when compared with the U.S.,
Delaware in particular, where their laws indicate that directors’ duties are
to the corporation and the shareholders, which a few practitioners felt was
treated as one and the same by the American courts. One distinguished
how American jurisprudence “is more clearly articulate that the interest
of the shareholder should be foremost in the thoughts of the board in
terms of maximizing shareholder value than perhaps has been articulated
historically in the Canadian jurisprudence.” There is, therefore, “a slightly
different focus in Canada.” In terms of its application, one practitioner
noted that boards do not have an obligation to any potential stakeholder
but described it as a “kind of continuum…the board feels they have a
greater obligation to consider the shareholders, employees, and the local
community they operate in, but the obligation probably decreases as the
strength of the relationship with other constituents increases.” Another put
it in the context of proportionality:
There is a difference….You do have to consider all the influences of
the company when you’re making decisions, because it is in the best
interest of the corporation, but when you look at what that means—
the corporation—predominately you’re talking about the investors,
the people who put in their money to own a stake in the company….
As a director, you’re out there for all the world to see as to how the
shareholders have judged and measured you. You don’t have that same
scrutiny with these other stakeholders…so practically, directors are
driven to that same relative view.
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Nevertheless, a large majority of the practitioners felt that even if there
was a theoretical difference between “best interests of the corporation”
and “best interests of the shareholders,” the difference was “largely
indistinguishable” in practice because a business case could be made
that best interests of the corporation equated to the best interests of the
shareholders.23 Many expressed how one can easily make an argument that
if the corporation is acting in the best interests of all of its stakeholders,
over time the wealth of shareholders will be maximized. Most agreed (with
a few exceptions) that the shareholders should be the foremost priority for
directors, with other stakeholders’ interests being considered depending
on the issue at hand.
A number of practitioners implied that the negligible difference could
become relevant in narrow circumstances. For example, the difference
could become acute in times of financial distress or when a significant
stakeholder is involved. Two gave the example of a pipeline across First
Nations territory, where in that scenario the corporation should have regard
to the broader interest of stakeholders.
One of the practitioners who found a stark difference between the
best interests of the corporation versus the shareholders admitted that
“certainly the entire shareholder community in Canada would say it’s
all about the shareholders, absolutely.” Nevertheless, this practitioner
reiterated the point that doing what’s in the best interests of the corporation
is really something for the directors to determine, and is not beholden
to any particular stakeholder group, including shareholders. When this
practitioner was informed that several participants felt that “best interests
of the corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” were of
negligible difference, the practitioner responded:
If you are trying to advise a board in a manner that keeps them out of
harm’s way, that’s different. Providing that kind of advice, practically
speaking for a lawyer advising a client, is much different than talking
about the legal theory. Because you can have all kinds of laws, but when
you’ve got one group who is the most likely to sue you, you tend to
worry about that group….People’s sense of right and wrong will also
change over time but I don’t think the legal theory is going to change.
So it is kind of a flexible concept that can accommodate a lot of different
views of a lot of different kinds of directors.
23. See e.g., comments such as: “You can make an argument, at least academically you can as a
director, that if we run this corporation in the best interests of all of its stakeholders over time we will
maximize wealth for shareholders”; “In order to be a good corporation and do what your shareholders
want and make value for your shareholders, it may make an awful lot of sense to do good things for the
community or good things for the environment or good things for your employees, because it’s good
for the owners.”
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A few practitioners echoed this sentiment, reflecting on how Canada is
more flexible in that it can, in any particular set of circumstances, put the
best interests of the corporation to a wider group of stakeholders.
In a significant majority of times during a corporation’s existence,
directors may find there to be little practical differences between decisions
made in the “best interests of the corporation” and the “best interests of
the shareholders.” Many practitioners felt that there should be a healthy
balance and greater proportionality given to the interests of shareholders,
who have taken on the financial risk. Given the strong business case to
consider stakeholder interests, these interests almost always align with
increasing share value in the long term. A few practitioners did cite some
limited circumstances where the difference may become more acute.
Simply, can “best interests of the corporation” take into account interests
other than the shareholders better than “best interests of the shareholders”?
The theoretical answer is obviously a yes, and the answers from these
practitioners also suggest the affirmative is possible in practice. Many
questioned whether actions made in favour of stakeholders’ interests
are even distinguishable from actions benefiting shareholders and the
corporation in the long-term.
3. Consideration of stakeholder interests
Principle: “Other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees,
suppliers, and customers, should have their interests protected by
contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in
corporate governance.”
While there were some differences among practitioners in the treatment
of this principle and the meaning behind “participation in corporate
governance,”24 the overwhelming majority interpreted the principle to
mean that the protection of non-shareholder stakeholder interests were
outside the scope of corporate governance practices, particularly with
respect to the board’s corporate decision making.
A handful of practitioners agreed with the principle, citing significant
protections available to non-shareholder stakeholders through contractual
and regulatory means. One felt the principle was correct because

24. Some practitioners had a different interpretation of the meaning of “participation of corporate
governance” in this principle. One practitioner, for example, pointed out that in continental Europe,
unions were provided with representatives on boards. Any practitioner who construed the principle
in this manner was in agreement with it. When the principle was interpreted to mean there was a
strict choice “between people protecting their own rights, rather than having a voice in the corporate
decision,” then generally speaking, practitioners tended to agree that it is “an accurate statement, but
it isn’t a complete statement.”
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shareholders are the ones without contractual rights, thus directors had a
primary duty to protect their interests above those that already have builtin protections through contract and/or regulation. Another felt strongly that
contractual and regulatory protections were sufficient for these interests,
reflecting on how “we’ve forgotten what contracts do….Corporations have
to operate within a contractual set of obligations they’ve undertaken and a
regular set of obligations.” When asked whether regulation was sufficient
protection for environmental interests, the practitioner responded that “the
people that should be sued are the government for being totally negligent
about adequately regulating the destruction of our environment…the bulk
of the deficiency is the intellectual paucity of environmental regulation.”
Several questioned how Canadian common law fit within this principle,
with a few recognizing that courts “have become more aggressive in
identifying and protecting the non-contractual rights of other corporate
stakeholders” and a handful pointing out how “it’s a little bit different in
Canada as a result of BCE—the court has decided that other stakeholders,
irrespective of their contractual relationships with their company, have an
interest that needs to be protected.” Practitioners were asked to opine on
the 2008 decision in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (BCE)25 and its
impact, if any, on Canadian corporate governance practices.
a. The BCE decision
In brief, the facts of the BCE decision are as follows. The debentureholders
of Bell Canada, a subsidiary of BCE Inc., used the oppression remedy to
seek relief concerning the privatization of BCE by a consortium of private
equity buyers under a plan of arrangement that had been determined by
BCE’s directors to be in the best interests of BCE and its shareholders.26
The contractual rights of the debentureholders would not be affected
by the board’s decision. Upon the completion of the arrangement, the
debentureholders stood to lose approximately 20 per cent of the shortterm trading value of their holdings. The court ultimately found in favour
of BCE Inc., and against the debentureholders’ claim.27
25. BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, 3 SCR 560 [BCE].
26. The oppression remedy will be discussed in greater detail in Section II.5.
27. Several summaries and analyses are available for further details on the case. See e.g. Mohammad
Fadel, “BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law” (2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 190; Edward
Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary
Duties” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 232; J Anthony VanDuzer, “BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The
Supreme Court’s Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples”
(2009) 43 UBC L Rev 205; Sarah P Bradley, “BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders: The New Fiduciary
Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance, and Good Corporate Citizenship?” (2010) 41:2
Ottawa L Rev 325; J Alex Moore & William Ainley, “BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: An Unexamined
Question Considered,” online: (2009) Davies <http://www.dwpv.com>.
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In its decision, the SCC reiterated its findings in the 2004 decision
of Peoples Department Store Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise28 that directors
were permitted to consider the interests of, among others, “shareholders,
employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”29
The court’s finding that the debentureholders had a reasonable expectation
for their interests to be considered implies an obligation on the board to
at least consider such interests. The court held that directors were “not
confined to short-term profit or share value,” but that, where the corporation
is an ongoing concern, directors were to look to the long-term interests
of the company, and the context of this duty varied with the situation at
hand.30 The court also reinforced its support for the business judgment
rule.31 Moreover, the court held that directors were required to act in the
best interests of the company “viewed as a good corporate citizen”32 and
“commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate
citizen.”33 The court did not elaborate further on their concept of good
corporate citizenry.
No practitioner expressed dismay over the ultimate result of BCE.
Many specified that whatever they felt about the rest of the decision, the end
result in favour of BCE Inc. was the correct one. A handful of practitioners
found the SCC’s findings in BCE very positive overall, making comments
that they “quite liked the decision” and its conclusion, calling it “a breath
of fresh air,” and declaring that the court in BCE “really started to get it
right.” These practitioners were pleased that the decision “gave a little
more ammunition to the notion that the board can take a broader view
when it makes its decisions.”

28. Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68, 3 SCR 461 [Peoples]. In brief,
following the bankruptcy of Peoples Department Stores Inc., the trustee brought an action against the
company’s directors for breaching their fiduciary duties by, prior to the bankruptcy, implementing a
credit scheme that favoured Peoples’ parent company, Wise Stores Inc., over its creditors. The Supreme
Court found that when considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may
consider stakeholder interests and that in this instance there was no breach. Several summaries and
analyses are available for further details on the case. See e.g. Catherine Francis, “Peoples Department
Store Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duty of
Care” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 175; Darcy L MacPherson, “Supreme Court Restates Directors’ Fiduciary
Duty—A Comment on Peoples Department Stores v. Wise” (2005) 43:2 Alta L Rev 383.
29. BCE, supra note 25 at para 39.
30. Ibid at para 38. Regarding the oppression remedy, the court found there was no violation by the
directors in their fiduciary duties.
31. The business judgment rule means that courts will defer to the directors’ business judgment so
long as those directors used an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence in reaching a reasonable
business decision at the particular time the decision was made. See Peoples, supra note 28 at paras
64-65.
32. BCE, supra note 25 at para 66.
33. Ibid at para 82.
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Others expressed hesitancy over how important the case was to
Canadian corporate law. One practitioner, for example, was “not a believer
that one case is particularly important in the general scheme of things”
or that a particular case “fell off one side or the other at the head of a pin
on a very narrow point.” Instead, the practitioner felt it was important to
consider the “run of cases” and with respect to Peoples and BCE, they felt
that “neither of them did anything particularly surprising” and that it “was
not a watershed.” A few practitioners considered the decision “a reflection
of the times” that was also “a product of a lot of things that preceded it,
and not just within the legal arena but within society, in the larger sense.”
Another practitioner, who previously expressed that “best interests of the
corporation” had a significantly different intent and meaning than “best
interests of the shareholders,” believed the court had simply “repeated the
law the way it’s always been,” and echoed the sentiment that the decision
was one that happened gradually along a broader trend in Canadian
corporate governance history. The practitioner felt that, aside from the
good corporate citizen concept, the decision “wasn’t groundbreaking.”
Interestingly, the majority of practitioners found several problems
with how the findings of the court were articulated, calling it “a thin piece
of work,” “incoherent,” “terrible,” “peculiar,” “written by people who
didn’t understand corporate law,” “basically written by their clerks,” and
the articulation of the fiduciary duties of the board “contrary to common
sense” and “a bit impractical, frankly.” Several felt that the decision would
not assist the lower courts on what the right approach was to oppression,
fairness, etc., depending on the context.
Nevertheless, many conceded that the decision could not be ignored,
since “it’s the Supreme Court of Canada and it’s a very recent and big
case.” One practitioner said that BCE is “kind of a dog’s breakfast; there’s
something in there for everybody” but there was no question that BCE
has caused legal advisors “to tell any board that they can—and indeed
should—take into account non-shareholder value issues.” The practitioner
pointed out that “these are all things that we used to take into account
before BCE, but BCE is now giving you more of an overt license to do it.”
Many practitioners felt the decision was a clear step away from a
shareholder primacy model of governance, with one stating that it “clarified
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that the Revlon rule34 does not apply in Canada, and boards are not required
to act as the role of auctioneer in an M&A context, with their sole goal
being to maximize shareholder value.” Nevertheless, a few practitioners
bemoaned the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada left questions open
when they could have been settled. One wished that the Supreme Court
of Canada “had been far more hawkish and clear” and “would really like
the court to specifically clarify Canada’s take on corporate governance
versus the U.S. because we are such a small market compared to our
neighbours—we’re inundated with U.S. information.”
b. Good corporate citizen
Practitioners were asked whether they thought boards were aware of
the Supreme Court’s comments regarding how the best interests of
the corporation are to be “viewed as a good corporate citizen” and
“commensurate with a responsible corporate citizen” as per BCE.
Answers were split down the middle, with almost half either somewhat
disagreeing or disagreeing, and the other half either agreeing or strongly
agreeing. There tended to be two camps among practitioners, with one
considering the good corporate citizen concept “an interesting throwaway
line…a bit gratuitous,” and the other finding that it “really does set
Canada on its own path.” Some practitioners pointed out that the good
corporate citizen concept was something “better understood amongst the
lawyers” and “business people tend to not pay that much attention to it
or not be as aware of it.” A handful of practitioners also noted that many
companies want to be viewed as good corporate citizens, and “this is not
because of anything the Supreme Court says.” One sensed that the good
corporate citizen concept was “not getting any airtime” in small to midcap companies struggling for capital relative to larger companies that were
“not going to live or die quarter by quarter” because “it’s hard to think of
these concepts when you’re in survival mode.”
There was much discussion on how the “good corporate citizen”
concept was difficult to apply, as can be seen from these various responses:
34. The Revlon rule refers to the fiduciary duty of American boards to maximize shareholder value
in change of control transactions. Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A 2d 173 (Del
Sup Ct 1986). Prior to 2004, a series of cases in Canada, particularly from Ontario, spoke to the
existence of a fiduciary duty for directors to take reasonable steps to maximize shareholder value. See
e.g., Casurina Limited Partnership v Rio Algom Ltd (2004), 40 BLR (3d) 112 at para 27 (ONCA);
Pacifica Papers Inc v Johnstone (2001), 15 BLR (3d) 249 at para 30 (BCSC) affirmed in Pacifica
Papers Inc v Johnstone (2001), 93 BCLR (3d) 20 (BCCA); Gazit (1997) Inc v Centrefund Realty
Corp (2000), 8 BLR (3d) 81 at para 69 (Ont SCJ); CW Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western International
Communications Ltd (1998) 160 DLR (4th) 131 (On Ct J (Gen Div)); Benson v Third Canadian
General Investment Trust Ltd (1993), 14 OR (3d) 493 at 500 (On Ct J (Gen Div)); 347883 Alberta Ltd
v Producers Pipelines Inc (1991), 80 DLR (4th) 359 at 399-402 (SKCA).
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Nobody really knows what it means. If I went to a client and said, “Be
sure when you do that that you’re acting as a good corporate citizen
because that’s what BCE says,” the next line is going to be, “And what
does that mean?” and I’m going to shrug and say, “I don’t really know.”
They’ll say, “Why did you tell me that? What do you want us to do with
that?” Practically speaking people don’t run around talking about it that
way.
Obviously a good corporate citizen is better than saying, “You better
up your profits this quarter.” But I really do think it’s a bit of apple pie,
motherhood type of statement. It’s pretty hard to say. I mean, are you
going to have liability if you’re not viewed by the outside as a good
corporate citizen?
The Supreme Court makes this bizarre statement to stakeholders about
good corporate citizenship and then specifically refers to some purported
stakeholders. If you’re going to go there, you either should have given
guidance or not gone there. They sort of left it. They got it out there, but
it’s still sort of a blank page.

One practitioner felt that there was an “upwards trend” towards good
corporate citizenry, and wasn’t sure if that was a reflection of legal
development so much as “a maturing of some of the thinking that goes on
in the boardroom,” while a handful noted that an increase in independent
directors and director education is “really having an impact” on director
awareness of these legal concepts.35
A small group of practitioners felt the need to qualify their answers,
citing how their personal preferences on the matter were divergent from
their legal take on the state of the common law. These practitioners,
most of whom found BCE a disappointment in its applicability to legal
practice, expressly stated that they appreciated the direction of the court
in supporting more of a “social conscience” in corporations. Despite
this, a few questioned whether the law had the capacity to do so; others
questioned whether it was even appropriate.
c. Influential to practice?
Practitioners were asked whether BCE had influenced the decision making
of Canadian boards. The collective response was that boards have been
influenced by the decision, with almost all agreeing or strongly agreeing,
and only one practitioner somewhat disagreeing. Nevertheless, there was
significant consensus that the influence was more regarding the process
35. One practitioner had a notably different take, finding director education and certification
programs a “huge disservice to the capital markets” because they cause inexperienced people to
believe they have the tools to sit on a board “just because he or she has taken a course—that’s a
nonstarter.”
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of decision making, and there was serious question as to whether it had
made a difference in terms of changing results. On how the BCE decision
largely influenced the process, here are some select responses from various
practitioners:
That’s why take-overs in Canada are so complex; the documentation
is so complex, and they outline in great detail every meeting that’s
been held, every discussion that’s been held, what the fairness opinion
said, what other valuations have said, etc.…The result becomes a very
process-driven process; processes can be used to defend judgments, but
they don’t necessarily facilitate making good judgments.
Let me repeat something I have said to counsel boards at various
situations: the reason you hire lawyers and investment bankers and all
of that is so that you can demonstrate how thorough a process you went
through. You sat through the process, and you basically say: we dotted
our i’s and we crossed our t’s and this was the result we have.
Did we consider the various issues? Did we record that we considered
them? Did we get the advice that we needed to consider them? BCE
has built into corporate governance more procedural requirements. My
instinct is … where you had situations where people were attempting to
be conscientious I suspect they would have got to the same place, but
now they won’t get there without jumping through hoops.
If you’re faced with a take-over bid and you’ve some competing
stakeholders, clearly BCE will be mentioned. If you’re going into a
plan of arrangement and you need to do the fairness criteria, it may be
mentioned but more as something that’s entirely decipherable rather than
unclear….Magna was one of the first cases where it was really argued in
detail. It was not pretty.36

36. Re Magna International (2010), 101 OR (3d) 736 (Sup Ct) [Magna, Sup Ct], aff ’d (2010),
101 OR (3d) 721 (Div Ct) [Magna, Div Ct]; Ontario Securities Commission, “In the Matter of The
Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S-5, as Amended and In the Matter of Magna International Inc and In
the Matter of the Stronach Trust and 446 Holdings Inc” Decision and Order (24 June 2010), online:
OSC <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings>. Briefly, the Magna decision attempted
to expand and/or clarify on some findings in BCE. The court confirmed that it would only consider
whether there is a valid business purpose from the perspective of the corporation; there is no need
to determine a valid business purpose from the shareholders’ perspective. However, where the
court is considering different interests within the same class of stakeholders, more weight can be
placed on the shareholder vote in determining the fairness and reasonableness of the arrangement
than in circumstances where the court is balancing competing interests between different classes of
stakeholders. The details of Magna are particularly complex, thus readers are encouraged to review the
several summaries and analyses available for further details on the case. See e.g., Edward Iacobucci,
“Making Sense of Magna” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 237; Anita Anand, “Was Magna in the Public
Interest?” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 311; Emmanuel Pressman et al, “Key Lessons from the Magna
Decision” Osler Corporate Review (September 2010), online: Osler <www.osler.com>; Kent E
Thomson et al, “The Magna Proceedings: Devising a Litigation Strategy and Elaboration on the BCE
Test,” online: (2011) Lexpert/American Lawyer, Davies <www.dwpv.com>.
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There were many that pointed to the risks of having an overloaded
process, and how it can quickly become boilerplate, stating how “the more
you make something process-driven, the less meaning it has for people.”
In answering whether Canadian directors in actuality consider nonshareholder stakeholders in their corporate decision making, whether it
be due to Canadian corporate law or otherwise, 71 per cent agreed that
directors take stakeholder interests into account, 10 per cent remained
neutral, and 19 per cent disagreed. Several suspected that any consideration
of stakeholder interests was due more from business motivations than
anything required by corporate law.
One practitioner acknowledged that “it’s early days yet, it’s hard to tell”
what the effects of BCE are, but as a practical manner “a lot of practitioners
would probably tell you that a high enough offer price in a take-over will
still prevail.” A handful of practitioners noted that the decision “may have
given a target board some more ammunition with which to fight off a bid
that they don’t like.” Others were much more skeptical as to the impact of
the decision. When advising clients, one practitioner put it bluntly: “I say,
‘the owners get the money and at the end of the day the Supreme Court
said that’s right.’ Cut through all of the flowery language, the nice poetry,
that’s what happened.”
As with the similar finding from practitioners’ comments in Section
II.2 with regard to the “best interests of the corporation,” practitioners
tended to feel that the exercise of considering stakeholder interests could
result in a different result in narrow circumstances. A few practitioners
provided theoretical examples, and a small number referenced the TMX/
Maple transaction as “a great test case where the board could have come to
a non-maximizing shareholder value decision.”37 One practitioner pointed
out that oftentimes it was not just a process issue for boards, but some
stakeholders are a force to be reckoned with in any case. Creditors, for
example, can be very influential and it is difficult for boards to ignore them.
The practitioner put it this way: “The board is not sitting around saying,
37. The TMX/Maple transaction involved the takeover of the TMX Group Ltd., Canada’s main stock
exchange company, by a consortium of banks and pension funds under the Maple Group Acquisition
Corp. One practitioner described how in the transaction,
The board clearly felt strongly that it had fiduciary obligations to stakeholders that went
well beyond the shareholders, because they act as a market for the financial system and it
was very important. Interestingly, OSC was wearing two hats in that transaction. The one
hat [was concerned about] shareholder interests being protected…but they were also the
regulator of the Toronto Stock Exchange and very much wanted the ultimate owner of the
Toronto Stock Exchange to honor all those other obligations it has to other stakeholders.
The practitioner noted how the transaction was “a lot of pure corporate theory playing out in practice,
where the securities regulators and corporate theory have collided…trying to come up with a
transaction that would be good for the Canadian market and good for the shareholders of the TMX.”

A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance

581

‘Gee, I wonder who this would harm? Maybe it would be the creditors.’
Usually the creditors are right in their face, it’s not like they have to put the
creditors on their agenda.” Another reflected on how the desire to consider
stakeholder interests tended to be linked to lifespan of the corporation, as
directors were more inclined to listen to stakeholder interests when the
company is in insolvency or near insolvency.
d. Extent of consideration: May, Should, or Obligated?
The BCE decision left open for many—directors, practitioners, and
academics alike—the question as to the extent of obligation to consider
stakeholder interests.38 Thus, in an attempt to see if there was some
consensus among this group of leading Canadian practitioners, all were
asked the question, “Do you believe directors may, should, or are obligated
to consider stakeholder interests?”
Several practitioners did not commit to one option, but chose two
(such as “between may and should” or “they should and they are obligated
to”). On the continuum of may being the least restrictive for directors, and
obligated being the most, where the most restrictive answer was used as
the recorded answer of the practitioner, 44 per cent of practitioners said
directors were obligated to consider stakeholder interests, 40 per cent felt
that directors should consider them, and 16 per cent felt directors may
consider them. Comments that help to colour in practitioners’ answers, as
well as other noteworthy ones, are cited below.
One practitioner, who believed there was a legal obligation, summarized
the sentiment echoed by most of the practitioners who answered in that
manner, stating that “the trick is they can make a decision that may be
counter to those interests, but they’re obligated to consider them in the
event.” For practitioners that did not think there was an obligation, a few
offered reasons why, explaining that “it doesn’t seem possible for the same
group of people to owe conflicting duties to two different groups” and that
it is almost impossible to impose this kind of an obligation to have regard
for the interests of all stakeholders, because “how do you differentiate,
38. See e.g., Iacobucci, supra note 27 at 234; Edward Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE, and
the Good Corporate ‘Citizen’” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 439 at 442. Regarding the decision, Waitzer
and Jaswal noted how:
Even the questions of whether directors may consider, should consider, or are obliged
to consider stakeholder interests, and, if so, at what point, were not addressed clearly by
the Court. Early in its reasons, it noted that, in Peoples, ‘this Court found that although
directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate,
although not mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or
particular groups of stakeholders’ [emphasis in original]. Later, the Court stated that ‘the
duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to treat
individual stakeholders…equitably and fairly.’ Is this duty mandatory?
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how do you favour, how do you choose?” Many concluded that once they
have taken stakeholder interests into account, then the decision made,
absent conflicts of interest and gross negligence, “should not be second
guessed” as per the business judgment rule. Thus, the obligation really
became one of process.
Even in circumstances where one believed the law requires less than
obligatory consideration, several practitioners recommended caution on
the matter, saying “it’s an easy test to meet and it’s a foolish test to fail.”
One practitioner in particular pointed out that “if you don’t pay attention to
a stakeholder interest, then you are left defending yourself saying, ‘I didn’t
have an obligation to do it.’” The practitioner went on to state:
Why not just pay attention to it and then decide to dismiss it? This is
where we get caught up in process so much as lawyers. It’s just a safer
thing to do. Turn your mind to it. Decide if it’s important then move on.
Our job is to protect our clients and so, it’d just be crazy for us to say,
“you don’t have to consider that.” It’s much safer to say, “Consider it,
balance it, then decide what you think is the right thing to do.”

Most found that there was little change to corporate decision making
subsequent to BCE, and a handful felt that this was because Canadian
corporate law had already progressed to incorporating stakeholder interests
through the oppression remedy and “best interests of the corporation,”
among other things. It may be that in the past “it just wasn’t as open a
discussion” as one practitioner put it, but the consideration of stakeholder
interests seems to have become a live issue in Canadian corporate
governance practices. Some practitioners were disappointed with how
BCE has forced a very process-driven exercise in Canada. Practitioners
did not offer any solutions as to how to counteract the negative aspects of
this process without stripping away the broader goals and/or interests that
presumably are aiming to be served.
In the aftermath of BCE, it is somewhat unclear from a legal stance
how the consideration of non-shareholder stakeholders fits in the decision
making equation for Canadian directors. Practitioners cited a range of
reasons why directors should consider stakeholder interests: due to BCE,
concerns regarding the oppression remedy, the business case for doing so,
or simply to play it safe given the ambiguity of Canada’s legal position on
the matter. Given that the combined total of 84 per cent of the practitioners
interviewed felt that directors were either obligated to or should consider
stakeholder interests as a practical legal matter, directors may be well
served by considering non-shareholder stakeholder interests in their
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corporate decision making, and documenting such process whenever
possible.
With regard to the good corporate citizen concept, one practitioner
noted how the concept was “a bit of surprise coming out of our courts…
they are not usually quite so bold.” Practitioners were split on how the
concept has resonated with Canadian boards, if at all. Many found it highly
irrelevant to board decision making, whereas others felt boards were
keenly aware, but emphasized there were usually broader business reasons
for companies electing to act with a social conscience. There is a high
chance that without the push of external market forces, such as changing
business trends and strategies, process alone will do little in motivating
corporations to act as good corporate citizens—the concept seems to have
been somewhat lost in translation from the courts.39 Corporations are free
to capitalize on the statement made by the Supreme Court, but since there
is no legal meaning behind the concept, they equally can ignore it. The
likelihood that it will become more relevant as a corporate governance tool
in the future is unclear at this point in Canadian corporate legal history.40
4. Protection for minority shareholders
Principle: “Noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protection
from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders.”
Many practitioners reflected on how Canada is home to several controlled
companies, thus strong minority protection is particularly important. In
Canada, it is easy for both founding and institutional shareholders to be
able to exert extreme pressure on boards. Due to those significant players
and illiquid stock, one practitioner noted how “movement in the stock can
be quite dramatic.” That being said, there was overwhelming agreement
that the principle of minority shareholder protection was “baked into our
corporate law.” Given the several options available to minority shareholders
and other stakeholders, there tended to be consensus that in Canada, “we

39. See, e.g., David A Lubin & Daniel C Esty, “The Sustainability Imperative” (May 2010) Harvard
Business Review 2, citing how sustainability is an “emerging megatrend” that may soon “force
fundamental and persistent shifts in how companies compete” at 2.
40. Industry Canada opened a consultation process regarding revisions to the Canada Business
Corporations Act (CBCA), and included a request for comment on whether elements of corporate
social responsibility should be included. The public consultation closed on 15 May 2014. Industry
Canada, “Consultation on the Canada Business Corporations Act,” online: Industry Canada <www.
ic.gc.ca>.
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are well taken care of.”41 The oppression remedy42 in corporate law and
Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders
in Special Transactions43 from the securities regulators were often cited
by practitioners as the most notable protections, although others raised the
ability to bring derivative actions,44 and another pointed to specific rules
under the Toronto Stock Exchange requiring minority approvals.
In particular, a number of practitioners expressed how the minority
protection principle was “more true in Canada than in the U.S.,” in that
“we are fairly unique” by having the concept of an oppression remedy,
which protects not only minority shareholders but other stakeholders as
well. One commented on how the oppression remedy in the past was
existing “but only theoretically available,” whereas now it becomes an
important tool in corporate law. Another expressed that the remedy “really
does work” in that “it scares the majority shareholders more than anything.
You can get into court in pretty short order. Courts do listen even though
the cases may have gone a lot of times the other way.”45 On the other hand,
one practitioner pointed to some limitations in the oppression remedy. It is
only available against shareholders that own more than 50 per cent of the
41. There were two notable exceptions in the group. One practitioner felt that there “is not enough
of a corporate perspective to protect the minority—it needs to go further” and “would just prefer to
see it dealt with in corporate legislation, rather than securities.” Another, who did support the principle
of minority protection, felt somewhat less sympathetic towards the plight of minority shareholders,
reflecting on how “if I buy shares as a minority in a controlled corporation, I do so knowing that it is
a controlled corporation and that there’s going to be a controlling shareholder at the end of the day.”
42. The oppression remedy is set forth in s 241 of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes to
describe the broader right of action on behalf of certain stakeholders (such as creditors) to apply to a
court to rectify matters complained of where: (i) any act or omission of the corporation effects a result;
(ii) the business or affairs of the corporation have been carried on or conducted in a manner; or (iii)
the powers of the directors of the corporation have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director
or officer. This right goes beyond shareholders of a corporation.
43. Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions,
OSC MI 61-101, 31 OSCB 1321 (1 Feb 2008).
44. A derivative action set forth under s 239 of the CBCA and similar provincial statutes creates a
broader right of action on behalf of certain stakeholders (such as creditors), in addition to shareholders,
to bring on behalf of a corporation to enforce the directors’ duty to the corporation when the directors
are themselves unwilling to do so. A complainant, who may be a registered or beneficial holder of a
security (including shares and debt obligations), a director or officer or former director or officer of
the corporation, or “any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make
an application,” may bring an action, upon obtaining the leave of the court, to enforce a right of the
corporation, including rights correlative to the duties of the officers and directors of the corporation.
45. See also, Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially
Considered: 1995–2001” (2004) 30 Queen’s LJ 79. In reviewing oppression cases in Canada, BenIshai and Puri contend that Canadian courts have applied the remedy in a way that reflects the primacy
of shareholder interests and nexus of contracts model in corporate law. However, the increasing
success of creditors as non-shareholder applicants pointed to a possible change in attitude by the
courts. Ben-Ishai and Puri suggest the cautious approach by the courts is likely to continue in the near
future.
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company and a claimant also has to be an affiliate of the company to be a
proper defendant. Since there are a lot of Canadian companies controlled
by 40-45 per cent of shareholders, the practitioner felt that the remedy had
more limited use than one would assume.
Regarding MI 61-101, most felt it had gone a long way toward ensuring
procedural and substantive fairness in related party transactions. There
was an exception made by one practitioner, who felt that the rule did not
prevent enough transactions that some would consider abusive because “it
simply becomes a kind of formula to get through” and therefore in many
instances “it just degenerates into a process.”46
Other options were also considered by the practitioners. A few noted
that while derivative actions were possible in Canada, they were not
common and “terribly expensive to launch,” and very few practitioners
referenced this option. Others highlighted how the Toronto Stock
Exchange has provided greater protection for minority shareholders by
providing majority and minority requirements for approval of certain
types of transactions, which listed companies are required to follow.47
Overall, most felt there was a good balance between the oppression
remedy and MI 61-101 in protecting minority interests. Reflecting on
Canada’s position in the principle, a few practitioners expressed how the
strength of Canada’s statutory remedies, some of which specifically take
into account the interests of other stakeholders, meant that Canada “cannot
have a model that is a hundred per cent shareholder primacy.”
Clearly, there are built-in principles in Canadian common law
designed to protect minority shareholders from exploitation at the hands
of controlling shareholders. While there were some nuances as to how
effective the principles were in practice, the general sentiment amongst
practitioners was that this principle was well supported in Canadian
statutory and common law rules, and that Canada also offers statutory
protections to other stakeholders beyond what is outlined in the principle.

46. The practitioner cited Magna as an example (see Magna, supra note 36 for further references),
stating:
There was vehement disagreement about whether that is a fair transaction or not and yet
it passed muster through that whole process….What the OSC will say is, “at least we put
it out in the open.” People see what’s going on. Yes, it may only be process, but it can’t
be done behind closed doors and if someone’s unhappy with it, then they can go to court
and try to put a stop to it and so on. The argument that would come up is not that one
shareholder has some protection, but is it strong protection? That’s where you might find
some difference of opinion.
47. For further discussion on the role the Toronto Stock Exchange has played in Canadian corporate
governance, see Section III.3.a.
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5. Principal measure of shareholder interests
Principle: “The market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is
the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.”
Under Hansmann and Kraakman’s definition of shareholder primacy, the
corporation is managed in the best interests of its shareholders, and in
identifying those the principal measure in a public company is the market
value of the company’s shares. For Canadian public companies, since the
proxy voting system does not make the identity of a company’s shareholders
accessible to its board, and since directors are to manage a corporation
in its best interests—which many practitioners identify as predominately
meaning the interests of its shareholders—how can Canadian directors
know what shareholders’ interests are? Presumably market value is the
measure. Practitioners’ responses, however, were mixed, with many
finding the principle problematic or incomplete, and others qualifying it
in several instances.
Several practitioners expressed that, while it was hard to escape
measuring a company’s worth by market capital or by share price,
sometimes market value doesn’t have any resemblance to intrinsic value,
particularly for highly illiquid stocks. Market value, explained some
practitioners, “has nothing to do with the shareholder” and “more to do
with shareholders’ expectations.” Many said that the applicability of the
principle depended in large part on the type of company and the investment
criteria, with a few practitioners citing how since there are many illiquid
companies in Canada, market value “is not really useful figure.” It is
just one of many measures and “doesn’t really tell that much.” Some
practitioners recognized circumstances where in the short-term market
value will dip, such as in cyclical businesses or in fluctuations expected in
anticipation of an M&A transaction. As put by one, “sometimes the best
interest of the corporation will point you in the other direction and…quite
often a board will take a step that does drive down or diminish share price
in the short term in the long-term best interest of the company.” Many
practitioners observed that, from the point of view of legal theory, those
directors “are perfectly entitled to do that and indeed, they are doing the
right thing.”48 Despite this, some noted that many external pressures force
boards and management to do things in the short term to prevent driving
down the trading value at the expense of long-term benefit.

48. Practitioners noted how it is usually the case in an acquisition transaction that the acquirer shares
drop and the target company’s shares go up, especially if shares are going to be issued by the acquirer
to complete the deal.
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There were many practitioners who came down hard on the principle
as a whole. One said that “if recent market experience has demonstrated
anything, it is how fallible market values are as a measure of corporate or
shareholder value.” Another found the principle “completely ridiculous”
and “sufficiently obtuse,” contending that the market value on any given
date never represents the true value. Still one other practitioner who
strongly disagreed with the principle made the argument that if market
value were the sole test, “you would say that the current Canadian practice
on poison pills, which is finally now under review, is the right practice...and
essentially eliminate the efficacy of the poison pill.” Overall, practitioners
tended to agree with one practitioner’s comment that “it makes all kinds
of sense to do a whole bunch of things that don’t generate short-term value
for shareholders if it advances long-term interests.”
The assertion that market value is an unreliable measure in relation to
the intrinsic value of a company is certainly not novel. One of the common
arguments against the shareholder primacy model is its overreliance on
market value as representative of shareholders’ interests. It has been
well-documented in academia and elsewhere that market value is a
fundamentally flawed measure of value in many instances, representing
at times “irrational exuberance and anxiety” in the marketplace, with
the events leading up to the global financial crisis as the most recent and
obvious example.49 How to combat the negatives associated with relying
on this measure is unclear, and beyond the scope of this article.
III. Canadian legal and regulatory landscape
While the securities commissions’ stance on defensive tactics is largely
touched upon in Section II.1.a regarding the poison pill debate, and the
courts’ proficiency in recent common law decisions is discussed in Section
II.3.a, this Section III discusses these issues from a broader perspective,
addressing the nation’s corporate legal and regulatory landscape and
practitioners’ views on how the courts, regulators, and other bodies have
shaped the development of corporate governance standards in Canada.
1. Inadequacy of legislators and courts as governance leaders
There seemed to be a common understanding among many of the
practitioners that the legislators and the courts were less influential in the
development of corporate governance in Canada for a variety of reasons.
While legislative action may be an appropriate route in governance
49. Peter Huang, “Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety” in Francesco Parisi & Vernon L
Smith, eds, The Law and Economics of Irrational Behaviour (Chicago: Stanford University Press,
2005).
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reform, only a few practitioners mentioned the role of the legislators in the
development of corporate governance in Canada. That itself may signal
how small a role they have played in the governance sphere, and indeed of
those that brought up the role of legislators during discussions it was almost
always to point out their insignificance in Canadian governance. One
practitioner pointed out that “legislators aren’t well equipped” to deal with
corporate issues and that corporate legislation “changes very infrequently
in Canada.” Any efforts to illicit legislative change become “an extremely
slow progression.” Another practitioner reasoned that corporate legislation
is “not something that politicians get particularly excited about” as “it’s
not something their constituency gets excited about.” Furthermore, since
corporate legislation operates on a federal and provincial level, and can
vary by jurisdiction, it has not proven to be a robust method of helping
governance practices evolve in Canada.
As for the courts, many practitioners did not shy away from their
strong feelings on the inadequacies of the courts in providing clarity in
governance:
I’ll let my cynicism shine through here. As a broad overgeneralization,
the courts are staffed by ex-litigators, many of which do not come from a
corporate background…and that applies to the Supreme Court of Canada
quite nicely. As a result, they’ve come to these decisions with immense
brain power but not a lot of practical, corporate experience.
I don’t think that the Canadian judges have a lot of self-confidence when
they go to corporate law, and that’s why decisions like BCE and Peoples
are so weak…they have been criticized as not being done with a huge
amount of conviction or expertise…When you go to court in Canada,
you’re going to get a very conservative kind of reaction…we don’t have
a lot of knock ‘em dead corporate cases.
Off the top of my head, I couldn’t name a corporate solicitor that’s gone
to the bench. You can have some challenges where you’ve got somebody
dealing with a business case that really has no background on how these
things really work, but anything really weighty in the business sense, no
matter which way it goes, is likely to be appealed. Often these things
shake out at the higher courts because, in general, these courts are quite
sophisticated.
Too few of our judges have any commercial experience….It’s a bit of a
crap game of who’s going to hear the case. The real fear of going to court
in a corporate matter is you’ll get somebody who you’ve got to sort of
start educating.

A few practitioners noted how the courts may be limited in developing
governance standards in Canada because “all the courts can do is discourage
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bad behaviour by sanctioning it. They simply have no instrumentalities to
promote good behaviour.” A number of practitioners noted that generally,
the courts give a lot of deference to the board due to the business judgment
rule, with one practitioner observing that “it’s a pretty low bar to jump over
in order for the courts to say, ‘I have to defer.’” If the boards have followed
proper process, avoided conflicts, and obtained enough information to
make an informed decision, Canadian courts have shown that they are
very reluctant to interfere.
Several lamented on the differences in Canada’s courts compared to
the U.S., noting that “there is a lot more self-confidence about the way
things are done there,” and commenting on how Canada does not have
a set of developed common law principles in corporate law as they do
in Delaware. Practitioners noted how the Delaware courts in particular
have “a very active and knowledgeable court system,” so that state has
the opportunity to be the national corporate law-maker, whereas that is
simply not the case in Canada. Practitioners generally found that Canadian
courts have become “intellectually shallow on business issues” because
of the securities commissions’ deep involvement with public companies,
although many practitioners found that the Ontario commercial list of
judges was particularly adept. Several appreciated the strength of the
Ontario commercial court, calling it “proficient” and “sophisticated” while
others noted how provinces like Alberta make an effort to direct particular
corporate cases to certain judges. One practitioner even envisioned a day
when Canada would have a bench as advanced as the Delaware courts,
commenting that “we can get there” and pointing to how judges on the
Ontario commercial bench “are able to come up with some very nuanced
and good decision making in real time.” Indeed, some practitioners noted
that, while the courts haven’t been as influential in the past on corporate
governance, “litigation is increasing,” and one practitioner pointed out
that “courts are being used in the governance world more tactically, so
people will fire in court procedures as a tactical matter, as shareholders
against boards, boards against shareholders.”
2. Guidance from securities commissions
Whether by choice or through a process of elimination, securities
commissions are now playing a major role in shaping Canadian corporate
governance practices. One practitioner described it this way: “Canada is
split into two—what the courts say, and what the securities commissions
say. And what the practitioners determine to be one way or the other
tends to be reflective of which power source they believe has the most
sway, and is the most relevant.” By virtue of the fact that the securities
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commissions are by design created for the purpose of protecting investors,
with a “public interest” jurisdiction to protect the capital markets, many
practitioners sensed that their influence has pushed Canada towards a more
shareholder-centric model of governance.50
Most practitioners identified with one practitioner’s statement that
“it’s the securities commissions through the CSA, their national umbrella,
which have driven the standards of corporate governance.” Many found
it a curious Canadian phenomenon that the securities regulators were
significantly affecting the corporate legal sphere. Practitioners recounted
how when the securities regulators initially began encroaching on a
space that was traditionally for the legislatures and the courts, it was
“extraordinarily controversial.” When the commissions first proposed
adding special approval thresholds on related party and other transactions
over a decade ago, one practitioner stated that
[i]t was a hot issue at the time as to whether they were overstepping their
jurisdiction. They were a specialized securities regulatory body, not a
specialized corporate governance body or a corporate law body, so what
business did they have in changing what the legislature had enacted in
the Business Corporations Act? This has nothing to do with the raising
of capital, the issuance of securities, or the fitness to sell securities of
individuals that need license under the traditional views of what the
Securities Act was there for.

The regulators’ involvement was understandable to some, in that the
commissions have an interest in the governance of organizations accessing
the capital market because “if they are better governed, presumably they will
need less securities regulation.” Practitioners reflected on how eventually
people got past the notion of the securities commissions overstepping their
jurisdiction and have now generally accepted the commissions’ role in the
Canadian corporate governance sphere.
A couple of practitioners, upon reflection, considered the role of the
commissions from a theoretical standpoint. One practitioner recalled how
the OSC recently came out with a paper on board diversity and measures
through disclosure to encourage having more women on boards, and
reflected,
My first reaction is, although it’s a subject that interests me, is this the
right place for the securities commission? Traditionally they kept out
of the issues like that, and it really caused me to think about whether
they belong there and whether that’s the right thing for the securities
50. Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S-5, s 127(1) para 3. See also the equivalent section in other
provincial acts.
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commission to do. I suspect their conclusion is if they don’t, nobody else
will, and somehow they work that into their ‘public interest’ mandate
that it will be in the best interest of Ontario investors if they can add this
diversity dimension to boards…but it’s a surprising step.

The other said that, in terms of appropriate jurisdiction under the
CSA and AMF proposals, “there’s an open question…their jurisdiction
ends somewhere and some defensive tactics in theory wouldn’t involve
any sort of securities issuance.” Nevertheless, both said that practitioners
have tended to follow what the securities commissions have said, whether
or not it’s securities-related or corporate law-related, without questioning
their jurisdictional reach.
When asked explicitly whether the securities commissions were
overstepping their role, several practitioners felt this was absolutely the
case, but nevertheless, “there’s a void, someone’s got to fill it.” The growing
role of the securities commissions in developing governance standards has
been evident. Among the several ways that the commissions have influenced
governance standards, one practitioner recounted specifically how the
commissions have required disclosure about director independence, have
imposed independence standards for audit committees, and have made
other disclosure requirements related to executive compensation, “which
ultimately influences the board’s behaviour if it has to be disclosed.”
Other ways that they have influenced boards are pronouncements about
selective disclosure. As one practitioner noted, “having the commission up
there hovering on top of the corporation does influence the way directors
see their job, the way boards are put together, and the way they conduct
themselves.”
Overall, the practitioners’ viewpoints in terms of the appropriateness
of the commissions’ role in governance tended to vary. The majority felt
the regulators were “better than the alternative.” For example, a few noted
that the Alberta Securities Commission has been quite effective in reform,
commenting on how their past involvement in the National Policy 58-201
Corporate Governance Guidelines51 has helped increase the overall quality
of corporate governance in Canada. Absent the securities commissions
establishing rules and guidelines, and the courts enforcing them, Canada
would not have the robust system that exists today. Another pointed out that
the commissions have probably gone as far as they can in the governance
sphere, and “having got to that point, nobody’s going to come out today
and say, oh get rid of all that, it doesn’t do anything.” Some pointed to

51.

Corporate Governance Guidelines, OSCNP 58-201, 28 OSCB 3640 (15 April 2005).
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how the commissions have “been positive in creating more fairness in
transactions” under MI 61-101. Whether or not the practitioners agreed
or disagreed with what the securities commissions did generally, many
conceded that the regulators are “knowledgeable and better equipped”
than legislative or judicial bodies in the field, and the courts are helpful in
providing outside constraints when the securities commissions “become a
little bit too zealous.”
Other practitioners tended to express general unhappiness over
the regulators’ dominance in the governance area. Several felt the
commissions are not well-versed in evidentiary rules and “make it up as
they go along.” They also often fail to establish principles that can guide
lower courts, with some agreeing that the commissions “are more effective
on the rule-making side than the jurisprudential side.” A few remarked
that the commissions have often disregarded findings from the courts. One
practitioner noted that Canada’s stance on defensive tactics “seems to give
a short shrift to what BCE is about...ultimately, the securities regulators are
just saying, ‘We don’t care about BCE—that’s just the Supreme Court of
Canada, who cares.’” And for a few practitioners, it was highly regrettable
that the securities commissions have dominated, with one stating that
there is “no place or need for securities regulators to interfere with the
carefully engineered corporate structure.” This practitioner found that the
commissions’ interference inhibits boards’ ability to fulfill their mandated
duties, resulting in “the fate of the company being put in the hands of
arbitrary shareholders.” The practitioner found the commissions’ myopic
focus on shareholder democracy “farcical” and said that “Canadian
business, our communities and society at large, are the losers as a result.”
This practitioner much preferred that the securities regulators follow the
lead of the courts in BCE, and the AMF proposal with regard to defensive
tactics.
Many practitioners felt that greater power by the securities commissions
in the governance sphere would mean greater shareholder primacy in
Canada. One reflected on how, “notwithstanding all of the academic and
judicial writing on the duties of the directors, as long as the securities
commission holds their current view, we are, in an M&A context, still very
much of the shareholder primacy model and that was tested very much by
the Magna case.” Another reflected a general sentiment by some of the
practitioners that “what’s in the best interest of the shareholder doesn’t
align with better governance. That’s where it falls down.”
The underlying issue tended to rest on the fact that since the securities
regulators are able to act on a coordinated basis across the nation they
are better equipped than those dealing with the administration of the
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corporate laws. One practitioner pointed out that the CSA “becomes a
very convenient place to deal with changes,” citing how the shareholder
advisory group, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, in terms of
changes that they or their constituency would like to make, “deliberately
seeks out changes through securities regulation” because they don’t view
it as practical to pursue changes in corporate legislation, even if, from a
philosophical perspective, it is more appropriate for that venue.
3. Other players
A number of non-regulatory bodies were addressed by practitioners in
terms of their influence to Canadian governance. The few that received
particular airtime from some practitioners included the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX), the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG),
and Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS).
a. Toronto Stock Exchange
As a practical matter, most if not all public entities are listed on the TSX,
hence they are regulated by the TSX.52 To be granted a listing, companies
are required to sign a listing agreement where they agree to comply with
TSX rules, including any subsequent rules issued by the TSX over time.
The TSX played a historical role in sponsoring the 1994 Dey Report53 and,
similar to some of the discussions in the previous section, there were open
questions as to the appropriateness of the stock exchange in requiring rules
beyond what was provided in the statutes.
One practitioner noted how the shareholder community has “very
effectively and perceptively focused on the stock exchange as an
instrumentality through which the boundaries could shift in favour
of shareholder votes on more and more things.” A number noted how
shareholder groups have had some success in persuading TSX management
to increase shareholders’ rights to approve actions that were traditionally
in the hands of the board. Several shared the sentiment of this practitioner
that “it is a very interesting phenomenon that the employees of a for-profit
listed company are making decisions that affect the relationship between
the rights of shareholders and the power of a board to manage the business
and affairs of the company,” and a number expressed some latent concern
over this. The practitioner went on to comment that “it seems like a curious
group of individuals from a policy perspective to be making corporate law,
52. One practitioner noted how the universe of issuers with publicly traded securities that are not
listed on the TSX or TSX Venture Exchange is very small.
53. Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, Where Were the
Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (Toronto: Toronto Stock
Exchange, 1994).
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effectively,” and another stated that “at a certain point you begin to wonder
whether it’s appropriate for them to make governance rules.” Another
practitioner’s view was pragmatic, in that “if [the TSX rules] work for
the way these companies operate, I guess I’m okay with that” but they did
emphasize that
sometimes you worry there’s a bit of a conflict of interest because the
exchanges want to attract the issuers to the exchange. The exchange
goes all over the world in places where there are growing economies to
encourage people to get listed in Canada. So there is a certain tension
that they would want to make it attractive to be listed here.

While the exchange is not making universal rules for particular jurisdictions,
they are making rules for every listed company and “it’s a bit naïve to
suggest that if a company does not like their rules, [it] can just delist and
go somewhere else.” Thus, some practitioners identified the TSX as “a
battleground where governance issues are discussed and are dealt with
because it’s a place that is willing to entertain the discussion.”
However, a number of practitioners noted that the TSX has “taken a
backseat” on influencing governance practices of late, with one pointing
out that once the securities commissions began getting involved in
governance matters, “more or less the people didn’t pay attention any
more to what the stock exchange was saying.” Another practitioner felt,
however, that the TSX was “stepping back into the governance game”
and “giving more powers to the shareholders.” Still, one other practitioner
shared how “you never feel with the TSX that they serve a comprehensive
philosophy about how governance should be.”
b. Shareholder advisory groups
A handful of practitioners expressed their views on the influence of
shareholder advisory groups in Canada, specifically the CCGG and ISS.
Again, due to the lack of guidance from the courts and legislatures on
governance, these practitioners found the rise of shareholder advisory
groups a very positive one generally, as the organization has stepped in to
advance good governance principles nationwide and has been influential
in setting and regularizing several governance standards. Nevertheless,
a number of these practitioners expressed their level of discomfort with
the amount of power and influence held by these representatives of
institutional shareholders.
Specifically, these practitioners shared concerns over how the CCGG
has more sway outside their constituent membership and “has made
themselves players in the market.” Canadian demographics allow for these
groups to wield enormous amounts of power since significant amounts of

A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance

595

concentrated investment capital in Canada are managed by funds and fund
managers. Many of those funds’ operational policies state that, on any
matters that go to a shareholder vote, they will vote with the CCGG or ISS’s
recommendations without looking behind why they are recommending it,
“giving these groups more influence than anybody bargained for.” One
practitioner commented specifically on how the ISS, being the watchdog
for institutional shareholders and public companies, “have a bee in their
bonnet about how much power they have over the words they say about
companies.” This practitioner pointed out how “the comment of ‘I like
this practice’ or ‘I don’t like that practice’” from the ISS “could turn
majority voting from an 80 per cent approval to a 50 per cent approval”
and they can influence all kinds of decisions. The practitioners noted how
public companies are occasionally frustrated with the level of influence
wielded by these groups, with one explaining that “there’s no recourse if
information put out by these groups is wrong, and it dramatically affects
a decision that a company is taking.” Another reflected on how “investors
may not understand that they’re not getting much in terms of independent
analysis on some of these big corporate decisions when they invest in a
fund.” Most of these practitioners expressed a need for either disclosure
rules, guidelines, or some other form of regulation to control these groups
due to their enormous ability to influence the market.
There is an interesting phenomenon in Canadian governance.
While it seems clear that the courts have tended towards greater board
control and broader consideration for stakeholder interests, by and
large the judiciary have fallen by the wayside in terms of developing
corporate governance practices, with the exception of the occasional
important case that brings particular issues to the forefront. For public
companies, the securities commissions have increasingly stepped up
their role in corporate governance to fill this void, along with other nonregulatory bodies like the TSX and shareholder advisory groups. These
groups are very influential in the regulation of public companies, and
by design seek to protect shareholders’ investments, which most often
translates to increasing shareholders’ rights. It remains to be seen from
the CSA’s proposed harmonized approach to take-over bids and any final
determinations regarding the CSA’s proposed National Instrument 62-105
and the AMF proposal as to whether the regulators will be tempering their
positions toward shareholder primacy in the future.
Conclusion
One practitioner commented that good governance simply boiled down to
one concept: common sense. Another had a unique take on the importance
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of governance in Canada, or lack of importance, finding “there is scant
evidence whether good governance makes any difference” and likening
it to a chicken soup theory, meaning “people say it does help because
they want it to....I have never seen a bad decision become a good decision
because of corporate governance.” This position was imparted to another
practitioner, querying whether that practitioner agreed with the position.
Reflecting for a moment, the practitioner responded:
You know what would be even better…it’s the stone soup theory. To me
that has some real appeal, because then, it’s artificial. It’s a stone, but
everybody is contributing something. It does make something; it makes
something worthwhile for everybody’s benefit. How we got there?
Nobody individually knows.

Corporate governance is in a constant state of evolution, deriving
from various laws, customs, and processes, with legal, regulatory, and
institutional pressures as well as issues tied specifically to particular
product and service markets. It is undeniable that there are significant
normative underpinnings. The exercise of outlining a Canadian model of
corporate governance is a tricky one: comparative analysis can be drawn
from not only theoretical definitions but real world national comparisons
as well, based on a variety of selected factors. One practitioner in the
study reflected on how corporate governance “is one of those things that
people struggle to define,” and another noted that corporate governance
“is a never-ending process…standards today are different than they were
ten years ago, twenty years ago, and so on….” Outlining a national model
may be a daunting task, and part and parcel of staking a position is that it is
particularly vulnerable to alternative viewpoints, exceptions, and criticisms.
Nevertheless, a healthy and robust discussion on the big picture view of
Canadian corporate governance is needed. While American academic
articles are frequently churned out addressing corporate governance
issues, the discussion only occurs in fits and starts within Canadian
legal scholarship. This qualitative study brings together some of the top
corporate legal minds in Canada to opine on the fundamental principles
that are driving the development of Canadian corporate governance today.
In speaking with 32 highly trained and highly skilled legal professionals
on Canadian governance matters, similar debates and discussions tended
to take shape, and these debates and centres of tension mark the borders of
how Canadian corporate governance is being challenged and developed—
be it through the courts, legislators, securities regulators, or other bodies
and external forces. One practitioner described the corporation as “more
of an organism, with various components through it. That organism
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is a growing, evolving one, and it changes with the times, and beneath
the society in which it operates.” This is also true of a holistic national
governance framework that guides these corporations.
Practitioners’ views on an overall Canadian model tended to depend in
large part on what each practitioner found most compelling: the constancy
of the corporate statutes and trajectory of the common law, or the power
and influence held by the regulators. Leaving aside change of control
transactions for the moment, the building blocks of Canadian corporate
law have some notable differences when compared with the academic
definition of Anglo-American shareholder primacy, and common law
developments have emphasized those differences. The legislation requires
management to act in “best interests of the corporation” and makes available
the oppression remedy, and taken with the 2004 Peoples decision and the
2008 BCE decision, practitioners tended to agree that Canada corporate
law has “overtones of a broader stakeholder model.” One practitioner put
it succinctly:
In fact, the shareholders do not have primacy in the corporate context
in Canada, although directors generally think that they do. It’s a very
difficult distinction that the Canadian courts made based upon our
corporate statutes and it’s a very difficult distinction to explain to boards
of directors.

Perhaps this difficult distinction may be why many practitioners tend to
keep those nuances in a Canadian model limited to boilerplate provisions.
Several practitioners found the differences in Canadian law compelling and
important, but the majority found the practical impact of these differences
largely boiled down to a change of the process in corporate decision making
only. Indeed, as one commented, “the areas of distinction between Canada
and the U.S. that’s recognized by high-end M&A corporate lawyers in
Canada probably isn’t recognized anywhere else.” Another practitioner
found this to be due to the fact that “the Canadian public, in my mind, is so
influenced by the U.S. experience, the U.S. media, and U.S. information
that it doesn’t even know whether the law in Canada is the same or
different.” And for many practitioners, de-emphasizing the difference does
little to no harm—keeping the focus on ensuring the process is complied
with, but ending up with the same answer after going through the process
is a less controversial route, from a legal viewpoint.
Of course, the current state of Canadian corporate law is only one part of
a larger story. For public companies, the Canadian securities commissions
have become increasingly influential in the governance sphere. Isolated
to a public M&A context, the lack of defensive protections available
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to boards and the shareholder-centric position held by the regulators
generally point to greater shareholder control in Canada. Interestingly, a
significant majority of practitioners did not prefer this trend. While a few
included broader communitarian reasons, the large majority focused on
how boards were not being utilized effectively in unlocking greater value
for their shareholders in M&A transactions. So in fact priorities between
the regulators and those practitioners supporting greater board control are
very much aligned—getting the highest share value for their shareholders is
the priority. Regulators have tended towards increasing shareholder rights
in order to accomplish that goal, whereas the overwhelming majority of
practitioners in this study felt that action is misplaced. They contend that
directors are in the best position to unlock share value, as it is their fiduciary
duty in the best interests of the corporation, but directors are being denied
the proper tools to do so. The practitioners’ concerns tended to be focused
on how the regulators have elected to protect shareholders’ value—it
should not be through shareholder approvals they say, but through greater
powers bestowed on the board to exercise their duties to the corporation—
which in almost all cases should translate to greater shareholder value. The
CSA’s proposed harmonized approach to regulating take-over bids may
signal a step away from how Canadian governance is currently forming
in the M&A context. Indeed, as one practitioner put it, “the shareholder
primacy model has different ingredients to it” meaning “there are some
elements that are stronger than in others” and most importantly, “the sands
on this can shift.”
The conflicting theoretical positions from the courts and the securities
commissions have enriched the dialogue on the current environment of
Canadian corporate governance. One practitioner noted how “we’re
still digesting the BCE decision—we’ve got a ways to go” and another
wondered if Canada is experiencing “an overture in decisions.” While
most felt that Canadian governance norms and culture are becoming quite
well-developed, the frequent pull in different directions from the regulators
and influential power sources in Canada has left Canadian governance in
a “period of uncertainty. We’re still trying to figure out what the model
should be.” Corporate statutes have not changed, but power dynamics can
shift. The rise of board education and influence has created more robust
mechanisms to govern corporations, while the mobilization of collective
action by shareholder advisory groups like the CCGG and the ISS has
meant that institutional investors in Canada are a significant force to be
reckoned with.
The common law has made the process of considering stakeholders
in the best interests of the corporation more overt, well beyond what is
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assumed in Anglo-American corporate legal scholarship. Layered onto
this corporate legal base, the securities commissions have provided other
measures to bolster the field of corporate governance in Canada, while
seeking to protect the integrity of the capital markets and the interests
of investors within those markets. These efforts, along with those from
other organizations, have raised and normalized governance standards,
increased checks and balances, and helped to develop a stronger voice
in the corporate governance movement within the last several decades.
Tensions may be part and parcel of vigorous development, and the current
debate on the treatment of poison pills should be seen as another healthy
milestone in the evolution of Canadian corporate governance.
Looking ahead, directors, policymakers, and scholars will benefit from
recognizing the tenets and the pressure points that form a Canadian model
of corporate governance. While this qualitative study has shown that there
can be a range of opinion as to how a Canadian model is defined, there are
takeaways. The high-level assumption that Canadian corporate law is one
and the same as American corporate law is incorrect. The hotly debated
topic of shareholder primacy within American scholarship—regarding its
merits, failings, suggested reforms, etc.—needs to be reengineered when
catering to a Canadian audience. The way in which Canadian corporate
laws have been formed by the legislature, and have been interpreted by
the courts, indicates that Canada has a more flexible model of governance
which incorporates the consideration of non-shareholder stakeholder
interests in corporate decision making. Landmark decisions by the
Supreme Court of Canada have emphasized these statutory differences,
particularly in BCE, causing many practitioners to inform boards that they
can—and indeed should—take into account non-shareholder value issues.
Stakeholder interests may have always had a role in governance under
Canadian statutory laws, but the courts have now generated a need for
boards to document their process of considering those interests.
The dominance of the securities commissions in corporate governance
has led to several consequences, some of which have been immensely
positive for Canadian corporate development—such as the enhancement of
shareholders’ rights in particular areas—and other consequences that have
been negative. In particular, the commissions’ tendency toward equating
greater shareholder control to better investor protection is problematic.
The fundamental principles that have formed the building blocks of
Canadian corporate law since the CBCA’s implementation in 1976, such
as the board’s fiduciary duties to the best interests of the corporation, and
others that have been enhanced through the common law, such as the
consideration of broader stakeholder interests, provide the best protection
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for share value. As for reformers looking beyond share value in the pursuit
of more sustainable public companies, the path of least resistance in the
current corporate environment is also through increased board control, not
greater shareholders’ voting rights.
The legislature and the courts can and should be providing the critical
foundations for our corporate laws, but in recent history they have not
proven to be robust methods of helping governance practices evolve in
Canada. The CBCA was last comprehensively revised in 2001, and since
then there have been significant shifts in Canadian governance standards.
The long awaited consultation process by Industry Canada regarding
revisions to the CBCA now provides legislators with the opportunity
to ensure that Canadian governance moves along the desired path of
development.
Although in its early stages, the CSA’s move to lessen Canada’s bidderfriendly position through its proposed “harmonized” regulatory approach
is a step in the right direction to correct power imbalances between hostile
bidders and target boards. Industry Canada may need to be deferential to
the jurisdictions that have been overtaken by securities commissions or
other bodies such as the TSX in certain instances, but on the other hand,
there are areas where Industry Canada must take the lead in forming the
laws that govern Canada’s corporations. Canada’s corporate laws need to
be modernized to reflect Canada’s leading position in good governance
practices, as set by those in the legislature and the judiciary who have
the mandate to consider the development of Canadian corporations as a
whole, and not just in relation to its investors. Industry Canada should seek
to offer carefully engineered corporate structures that will put Canada in
the forefront of corporations best equipped to deal with future economic,
social, and environmental challenges. While legislators have taken a back
seat in corporate governance reform in that last decade, that is no reason to
shy away at this juncture in Canada’s corporate legal history.

